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Despite the growing role that business has played in the development of
capitalism, the neo-classical paradigm has largely ignored the concept of
organization. This paper illustrates the neo-classical concept of the firm and the
entrepreneur. Analyzing both, the moral and economic thought of Adam Smith,
this paper explains why, in the heart of Industrial Revolution, the paradigm elects
an unrealistic and quasi-medieval concept of the firm. The paper argues that it is
not by chance that the collective actions and thinking were neglected, rather it is
necessary in order to maintain the core-values of the paradigm. Finally, the paper
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1. Introduction
Every school of thought has its own core-values. Neo-classical economics (NE) has the
self-organized market and its mechanism of allocation, the system of prices. Any other
economic institution must be understood as a secondary and derived element. Thus, the
prices allocate resources and the market sculpt efficient institutions. 
Neo-classical models about markets and prices combine, at least, four assumptions
(Langlois, 2001): 
a) Self-interest —a specific cocktail of individualism and utilitarianism— (Etzioni,
1990:24)
b) Omniscience; that is, certainty and no cost information; 
c) Conscious deliberation, or the so-called rationality principle, which contemplates
individuals who are able to consider options and choosing among them follow the criteria
of efficiency and, finally, 
d) Representative agent: behavior and action by whichever could be described as
displaying the first three elements, and producing identical agents.
With these four elements, the neo-classical approach itself has been able to elaborate a set
of theories. These so-called economic laws describe conditions by an efficient allocation of
resources. 
Many consequences of the neo-classical assumptions have not been specified in the
original theories, because they neither refer prices, nor supply or demand. Instead they
stipulate secondary elements which are embedded in the core-bases. However, whether it
recognizes or not, general market assumptions produce consequences as concerns4
behaviors and actions, developed by agents who work inside the diverse institutions of the
market, especially consume and production’s units.
In this sense, it is possible to stress that NE presents a well-elaborated theory of the
consumer (Cf. Damgard et. al, 2003). Neo-classical agents and behaviors maintain an
acceptable level of realism. In spite of this, the theory is affected by a considerable level of
hedonism, and it undervalues sentiments and no material goods (Dubé et al., 2003). 
On the opposite, neo-classical hypothesis about entrepreneurs and firms, which depict the
firm as a black box and entrepreneur as a production’s engineer, are very deficient and
utterly unrealistic (Baron, 1998; Baumol, 1968). In the real word, the firm and the
entrepreneur deny the neo-classical design. 
On the one hand, the individualism is denied. For neo-classical economics, the individual
“is capable of judging the comparative efficiency of means for obtaining the desire to
possess wealth… making entire abstraction of every other human passion or motive”(Mill,
1844:127). Whereas the natural tendency is to consider others with benevolence, altruism,
or, in general, as trustworthy persons. In the theory of the consumer, the assumption of the
individualism may be accepted without excessive care. However, in the firm, reciprocal
interactions are “sine qua non” conditions. Organizations are not a stock of information,
but knowledge, or structured information. Knowledge “lies in the particular connections
between elements, rather that elements themselves” (Loasby, 2002:1237). Relationships
that are not price-regulated are a concept foreign of the neo-classical version. In this sense,
NE “provides no reason for the prevalence of firms as distinct modes of organization”
(Dunn, 2000:422; see Langlois, 2001; Hodgson 1989). Inside organizations individual and
collective rationality work together, forming new structures or forms to decompose and
codify the information. Nevertheless, NE is not able to explain the role of collective
actions and “collective thinking” (Etizoni, 1990:187).5
On the other hand, “entrepreneurship escapes neo-classical modeling by definition due to
its relationship to novelty and change” (Brouwer, 2002:84). This is in contradiction with
both  omniscience  and  representative agent conditions (See Langlois, 2001). In NE,
entrepreneurship “needs to be defined with reference to a setting or context (e.g. start-up
firms) and in terms of actions taken by an individual with such specific setting” (Vecchio,
2003:304), however, a wide psychological approach supports that environmental
influences cannot totally explain the entrepreneurial behavior. Personality dimensions must
be included by predicting (Cf. Ahearn et. al, 2003). In fact, NE “is not able to assume
behavioral characteristic” (Hodgson,1989:250). 
Despite the fact that bounded rationality (Simon, 1961) and opportunism (Williamson,
1985) have been introduced in the core assumptions of Institutionalism, old hypothesis,
especially the instrumental rationality, continue in the models. The complexity of the non-
ergodic processes are not observed (Dunn, 2000), and the paradigm is unable to work with
total uncertainty. The American economic chaos produced after September 11
th 2001 is an
example (Cf. Beunza and Stark, 2003:152-3).
It can be said then, that, neo-classical firm and entrepreneur are obsolete, or, at least,
incomplete. Nevertheless, both are theoretically and practically maintained. This paper
offers a tentative explanation.
The structure of the argument is as follows. In the next section I summarize the role that
firm and entrepreneur play in the general equilibrium models, detailing neo-classical
prototypes as necessary corollaries of the pivotal assumptions of the paradigm. Showing
the historical deficiencies that both concepts present, I argue that the neo-classical firm and
entrepreneur were stillborn. I support that the neo-classical silence about real (or realistic
models of the) firm and entrepreneur is intentional. I affirm that an obsolete version was
accepted because NE would have otherwise been obliged to eliminate the assumption of
individualism, the representative agent and his perfect deliberation. Concretely, I argue that6
the “power center” (Etzioni, 1964; 1990) which characterizes organizations should damage
the neo-classical principle of the representative agent, and moreover that, collective
thinking could violate the strategic rationality.
The third section is dedicated to the Smithian’ business thought. Although Adam Smith
1 is
the putative founder of the classical school of economics, the NE is a cocktail elaborated
with many elements. It certainty contains a big part of Smith’s theories, but it includes
other “refinements” by Malthus, Bentham, Mill or Pareto as well. Nevertheless, neo-
classical mistakes in the concepts of the firm and the entrepreneur arose from classical
economics, and, concretely from the Smithian thoughtfulness. That NE does not analyze
organizations as elements with diverse logic of the market, and with collective rationality,
is a part of the legacy of Smith. The section stresses the mistakes of  his arguments
analyzing both moral (sympathy) and economic (invisible hand) theories. I conclude that
Smith was not able to define an “impartial spectator” and a “principle of sympathy” for
entrepreneurs, and that, therefore, he preferred to silence the concept of authority and
hierarchy, confining the entrepreneur in the function of inciting the division of labor. I
argue that both authority and hierarchy appear in his model as the product of an “artificial”
evolution of the market, understanding this expression as that selection process which is
“applied methodically” under the control of the human agent (Hodgson, 2002:267). This
idea is opposite to “natural” evolution of the invisible hand.
Neglected entrepreneurial aspects are wide and profound;  Trojan horses; falsifiable
(Popper, 1965) and critical elements of the NE. However, socio-economics, intends “to
consider actions by the community and the state as first step” (Etzioni, 2003:108), offers a
very incomplete design of the entrepreneur. The last part of this paper is devoted to
encouraging socio-economics to developing the firm as potential shared institution.
                                                          
1 Employed contractions:  WN (I,1,i): “Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” (1776), Book I,
Chapter 1, section, 1. TMS (I,1,i): “Theory of Moral Sentiments” (1759), Part I, Section 1, Chapter 1. 7
2. Neo-classical entrepreneur and firm
For NE the company is a black box and the entrepreneur is a production function. Business
is a technical unity which produces articles and the entrepreneur is the agent who provokes
and controls the production process —the transformation of inputs into outputs—
according to the technical rules specified.  
In this standard analysis, the study of the business is very similar to that of the consumer
(Cf. Hicks, 1942). There is a difference; however, which is the result of technological
determinants and not another group of questions which should be included inside this box
of so-called business organizational problems. Therefore, “there is no need, no room, for
entrepreneurial action” (Adaman and Devine, 2002:333).
Many authors (Cf. Dun, 2000; Groshal and Moran, 1996; Etzioni, 1990; Hodgson, 1989)
have pointed out the fragility of this theoretical body with relation to the figure of the
entrepreneur and the business. Nevertheless, this paradigm (Cf. Demsetz, 1995) has
certified; firstly, that economics produces theories about the processes of the market. In
order to make predictions about prices, in a “self regulated market” (Polanyi,
 1944:129), it
is not strictly necessary to know how entrepreneurs lead firms or how the division of labor
is directed and controlled. As Demsetz explains (1993:164) other firms, represented by the
market, are treated as a perfect substitute in production. In this sense, management by
definition is eliminated. 
Secondly, it has been argued that life inside the firm could be understood from a market’s
criteria. Edith Penrose (1959) asserted that the role of human intentionality inside
organizations could not be explained with neo-classical arguments. With a contradicting
view, Kerr and Jermier (1978) assert that most of the essential aspects of the leading firms,
could be structured and reduced to a set of routines. Nelson and Winter (1982) maintain
that those routines could be explained as a natural evolution inside a business. 8
In summary, NE is only interested in the result: a certain quantity of products which will
be sold in the market. How the production is made —a purely technological function
(Baumol, 1993:12)— is not an interesting topic.
In my opinion, this is not a feasible enlightenment. The NE presents an unrealistic and
partial conception of the firm and the entrepreneur for two reasons.  Firstly, its firm is not
analyzed as an organization. Secondly, the context is not understood as a hierarchical
phenomenon of thinking, but as another price-relation. Its firm is designed as a collection
of individuals who work in the same place, but not together, having the individual as its
decision-making unit (Cf. Etzioni,1990:4).  Not being an organization, the firm has no
opinion about collective goals; provides no reason for collective thinking or no material
synergies; it revolves exclusively around the efficiency of the means. The firm  was
governed by “a passive calculator” (Baumol, 1993:13) who captained a technical function. 
Obviously, this description depicts single-unit enterprises, with an individual or a small
number of owners and few laborers, where subjectivity, culture or spiritual factors, are
absent, and  each bilateral relationship could be explained through wages, profit, and
technique.
Nevertheless, researchers in economic history who focus on the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, the period in which economics consolidated itself as a discipline of scientific
character (Minowitz, 1993), offer unequivocal conclusions: if the capitalistic firm could
have only emerged after production factors had become mobile and property rights had
been established (Weber, 1927), then the classical firm could be perfectly capitalistic. If, in
accord with Marx (1844) and Schumpeter (1954), it was possible to understand this
process as a simple evolution of the system, then it can affirm that, when economics was
born, the evolutionary process had started. Acceleration of industrial growth, capital
accumulation (Mills, 1996:277), technological shocks (Romer, 1994), lengthy diffusion of
the innovations (Rosenberg, 1994), etc., can be largely observed. 9
The industrial revolution put the machine at the same level as the worker as a source of
industrial progress. In this capitalistic environment, technology is perpetually hungry for
new capital, which forces the enterprise to increase its size in order to subsist. This growth
results in the fading away of the old characteristics of the entrepreneur.
In the age where classical and neo-classical paradigms were born, the firm was not a
technological individual but a company which increased. Neither entrepreneur was an
isolated owner organizing technical labors of “executors.” The ingenuity of the
businessman had been replaced by the rationality of the manager, and the synergy of the
company remained stuck to the area of fabrication. In a historical moment where the
phenomenon of wealth was deliberately isolated from other social phenomena
(Cunningham, 1968; Polanyi, 1944); where economics aspired to be treated with
mathematical precision, the question is: why, starting with Adam Smith, were the firm and
entrepreneur treated with obsolete models? 
Let me clarify this allusion. As it is known, Smith chooses a pin factory (WN,I:1) to
demonstrate the efficiency of division of labor; this is one of his core arguments.
Curiously, after describing the process, Smith does not refer to the  pin factory again. In his
age, cotton —an industry where division of labor incites technological innovation
(Subiyana, 1996) — is the most used and cited example by thinkers.  WN (I) demonstrates
that Smith has ample knowledge of the cotton industry of his time; however, he employs
pins and rejects cloth. Why?
Mills (1996) argues that Smith did not understand the importance of the inventions of his
time. Indeed, contributions of Watt, Hargreaves or Arkwringht are not named in WN.
However, in my opinion, more factors must be analyzed.
Some of Smith’s ideas were originals and others were taken by contemporary authors
(James, 1963:76).  The pin factory must be placed in the latter category.  In fact, between
1722 and 1723 in Paris, “Traité de la Richesse des Princes” by Erns Ludwing Carl was10
published. This book describes the division of labor comparing the production of pins, with
exhaustive division, and nails from a traditional factory. This description attracted the
attention of Smith, who copied and reproduced it in the first chapter of WN. Nevertheless,
Viner (1965:108) notes that while Carl meticulously explained how the industry was
directed by the entrepreneur, discussing widely the appropriation of profit, Smith did not
make any mention of the entrepreneur. 
In my opinion, Smith found some disadvantages in the cotton industry. Needing many
production plants, it presented coordination and organization problems. For example, the
cotton industry employed a system of piece rates for paying wages. This system was an
incentive to laborers, but also to employers to speed up productions. “Elaborate structures
for piece rates were steadily developed in the cotton industry”(Tunzelman, 1995:6). These
structures required the harmony of opposite interests, because English labor was very
expensive. While in the pin industry, the division of labor was simple and only one
foreman was needed each day to supervise the work; in the textile industry, division and
mechanization is much more complex. Moreover, the supervisor must be changed by the
authority of one captain of industry (Marshall, 1919) whose labor could not be understood
as technical routine. 
If Smith had elected the textile industry, he would have been faced with the authority and
power of the “able but uncultured business men” (Marshall, 1890, I) and the hierarchical
relation, which could move the system of prices (Coase, 1937). In the extreme, authority of
the king, lord, or clergy, on a large scale would not be destroyed, rather replaced by the
authority of the entrepreneur on a micro level. A pin factory without reference to
entrepreneur, in a Taylorist style, permitted him to avoid these details.
This convenient and opportune oversight by Smith has not been corrected. 
From Smith, economics has advanced. Bounded rationality; incomplete contracts;
opportunistic behavior; asset specificity; imperfect competitive market; etc., have been11
included, refining some core assumptions. However, these variations contribute very little
to what approach understands about the dynamics of entrepreneurship. The NE is unable to
address “the issue of entrepreneurship owing to its epistemological standpoint” (Adaman
and Devine, 2002:334). There is a promising future in NE located in the transactions costs
approach, specifically in Williamson’s version (1985). His model about the opportunistic
behavior, with asset specificity, has contributed to explaining the diverse efficiency of
governance structures. This is a big step, because the existence of internal elements and
relationships in the business are admitted as factors of efficiency. However, “despite
Williamson’s frequent mention of ‘adaptability,’ transaction-cost economics is in the end
grounded in the same processes of static optimization as neo-classical theory” (Langlois,
2000:10). Research building on the works of Commons (1934) and Coase (1937) maintain
most of the core assumptions of paradigm. We are far from understanding the firm’s
collective actions and thinking.
Smith maintained an illustrative silence about the internal organization of the black box. I
think that the silence is an answer, as the inactivity is a decision. In this sense, I support
that the firm, which can divide the labor, and the entrepreneur, who directs the process, are
the Trojan horses of the NE. I affirm that, inside the firm, all the defects of the core
assumptions of the paradigm —specially the individualism and the conscious rationality—
are shown. In others words, I understand that neo-classical theoreticians described the firm
as a black box —in spite knowing that it was an unrealistic concept— because other
description gravely damaged the validity of the core assumptions of the model. 
What organization has NE? What organization needs you?  Although organizations are an
old invention, new ones are doted by specific characteristics. Knowing which of these
characteristics are refused by the NE is our immediate purpose.
Organizations (Etzioni, 1964:3) are characterized by (a) division of labor; (b) presence of
one or more power centers and (c) substitution of personnel. Requirements (a) and (c)12
could be satisfied if employment relations were regulated by modern markets. In a labor
market, whoever laborer, whichever time, could be removed and replaced by other laborer
whose labor produces similar results. The paradigm accepts that, in human repeated
processes, how the product is realized has effects in what and how many is made, but it
supports that, on most occasions, the how could be reduced and integrated into technical
functions. Thus, in a simple division of labor, laborers are totally interchangeable. If, it is
not work —action of man— but time which is bought or sold, how the division of labor is
realized is not so important. 
Requirement (b) is more complex. Only if production can be identified with fabrication,
then a simple (neo-classical) control center is required. This control is called to maintain
efforts in the direction signaled by technological plans, and controllers should have
technical or bureaucratic legitimation “spurs efficiency” (Brouwer, 2002:99). If production
exceeds fabrication, and spontaneous actions and outstanding achievement are included,
then sources of legitimation must be enlarged. Conferring authority is not equivalent to
offering a technical legitimation or a bureaucratic power, “rule of nobody” (Arendt,
1958:45). Non-bureaucratic forms of authority present some disadvantages for the NE,
because the personality or leadership, the no logical or illogical rationality (Pareto, 1917),
etc., prevent the firm from working as a mechanism such as a clock. 
The paradigm of classic science, the Newtonian mechanic, founds its symbolic expression
in the medieval invention of the clock, which is a manifestation of a simple and
instrumental rationality. The clock gives hope to modern science for many reasons. On the
one hand, it is an invention; that is, it was conceived and produced by man, but, after being
produced, the clock worked without human intervention. On the other hand, having a
complex structure, the clock’s behavior was easy to describe, following universal laws
conceivable by human reason.13
Under the potential of an innovation, it was difficult to resist the temptation to approximate
social reality, especially in economics, with this description. Campwell (1971:19), Skinner
(1975:180), and others support that works by Smith should systematically be applied to the
Newtonian order to ethics (TMS) and to economics (WN). In this last science, the clock
made that the utopia of a self regulated market a reality. In spite of harboring a complex
network of transactions, the market could function automatically and guide itself by
predictable universal laws. Time which can modify the environment to the behavior of the
actors decreasing the capacity of prediction (Cf. Fitzgibbons, 1995), was little by little
eliminated. With time is also the subjective content of human action. Science should be
objective; no political inkling, moral evaluation, particular feeling, nor social custom
should influence, neither one’s conclusions nor one’s premises (Minowitz, 1993).
Only two factors, both around the firm, could refuse this creed: the personification of the
entrepreneur, and the hierarchical relationship.
Neo-classical theories, certainty and uncertainty, have supported that, with relation to the
entrepreneurial function, the major role is played by the economic framework, that is,
economic conditions and environment, which —following Newtonian principles— could
be explained with mechanical or technical hypothesis. The mitigation of the uncertainty of
the environment (Knight, 1921); the innovation (Schumpeter, 1934); the development of
the information (Arrow, 1963); the reduction of inefficiencies (Kirzner, 1997); the combat
of market’s opportunism (Williamson, 1985), etc., “are economically grounded
justifications, rather than behaviorally based” (Vecchio, 2003:306). In others words, it is
the environment of market competition which induces entrepreneurial adaptive changes.
The firm and entrepreneur are limited to following spontaneously the laws of the
environment, which is governed by a superhuman and invisible power. 
However, in the real world, a “nexus” of contracts or property rights (Alchian and
Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) could not completely explain the birth,14
growth, and death of the firm. Obvious relationships between success (profit) and internal
organization (Adaman and Devine, 2002) were not contemplated. There are no-technical
events inside the organization that the “invisible hand” cannot control and that cannot be
explained by “natural” evolution.
The black box needs to be opened. Nevertheless, when the box is opened, the psychology
of the entrepreneur emerged. Differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs,
with respect to behaviors, values, or tendencies were detected (Silverthorne, 2001; Baron,
1998; ). Entrepreneur, being “so special,” hinders the standard modeling of the productive
agent. He does not work like a clock. At best, it should be as like a rooster. 
“Behavior has replaced action… Society expects for each of its members a certain kind of
behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to normalize its
members, to make then behave to exclude spontaneous action and outstanding
achievement” (Arendt, 1958:40). Inside firms, entrepreneurs may establish social systems
that are routine in character, but their own characters are never routine. Entrepreneurs act
spontaneously; they do not follow technical rules when looking for authority and
hierarchical collaboration.
Authority and power of businessman creates firms; hierarchical relationships create
organizations. Inside organizations, the system of prices is moved by the authority of the
businessman, who is embedded in different types of organizational structures (Adaman and
Devine, 2002:331). Two firms in the same sector with identical capital, technological
development and human resources; working in the same legal and economic environment,
can obtain diverse results. Therefore, the difference must be found in organizational
factors. 
Evidence illustrates that results of entrepreneurial action can not be understood as the
aggregation of individual results. Inside the firm, the ability of agents to maximize utility is
not unlimited, because cooperation and reciprocal service are needed. Cooperation can15
create supra-individual forms, collectivities which cast doubt upon the efficiency of
individualism. For both reasons, in my opinion, neo-classical thinkers, starting with Smith,
maintained obsolete models.
3. Ambiguities by Adam Smith
Adam Smith is not a liberal author. He is “unambiguously republican” (Gáspár, 2003:598).
On the one hand, self-interest motivates his prototype of man. On the other, this
philosopher attempts to convince us that self-interest has two dimensions: the first —the
private dimension—is oriented to one-self; the second —the public dimension— is
directed to other persons. On the one hand, Smith affirms that the invisible hand efficiently
governs and controls our market, but he supports, on the other, that, if it is needed, other
mechanical principles, as the sympathy, prevent agents confuse self-interest and egoism. 
The result of his “affable” republicanism is a wonderful ambiguity, which increases when
he analyzes the businessman and the firm. The private dimension of the entrepreneurial
self-interest, described by Smith through the “amiable and respectable virtue of prudence”
(TMS,I:5) and the public dimension, described through justice and benevolence, are on bad
terms. His entrepreneur is, simultaneously, benefactor and enemy of the society. As, after
Smith, Schumpeter (1934) assumed, the entrepreneur, who accumulates capital and
encourages the division of labor, is the principal motor of the social progress. Thus, he is
designed as the major “benefactor of the Society” (TSM;IV:2). As, after Smith, Marx
(1867) denounced, the businessman has the power to destroy himself, the mechanism of
the competitive market, and, therefore he is “enemy of the Society” (TSM;IV:2). This is
the Smithian businessman. Invisible hand and sympathy are not able to cut this Gordian
knot; this is the major Smithian headache.16
I propose to analyze both dimensions of the entrepreneurial self-interest: the prudent and
benefactor businessman and the egoist and unsociable entrepreneur. However, as I see it,
these descriptions must be placed as elements of a major theory: that of prices and
equilibrium. 
Maximizing his utility function is the goal of the neo-classical agent as an individual and
as a firm. Utility functions are individual and not transferable (in mathematical language
utility functions are independent). Therefore, if each agent is able to maximize his own
function, then the system will obtain equilibrium, which is the global result of the
aggregate of the individual utility functions. According to McCauley (2001:296), “the
economic profession has married itself to the notion of equilibrium and efficient market”
therefore, equilibrium is a desirable state.
The “invisible hand” is a curious mechanism for obtaining equilibrium. It does so by
maintaining the hypothesis of functional independency and perfect individualism, which
results in matching supply and demand.  Agents maximize their utility functions and obtain
their goals, following the reaching of equilibrium they trade to remain at equilibrium. In
this sense, the “invisible hand” maintains that actions and behaviors, which are beneficial
for one agent, are moral (Cf. Hausman, 2002:1768); that is, beneficial for the society.
Tending to equilibrium, agents and the society as a collection of agents, create a social
harmony.
Because the non invertibility of demand and supply as functions of price, Osborne (1977),
McCauley (2002) and others have stated that NE is internally self-inconsistent. The idea of
utility maximization is only an equilibrium condition assuming that utility is time-
invariant. 
This unrealistic hypothesis could be understood as an arbitrary assumption; however, it
presents an important philosophic base. The “invisible hand” is not only a system, but a
mechanism, an automatic and involuntary mechanism; the clock of economics. With it,17
every agent conforms “unconsciously” to economically correct behavior. Smith supports
that “it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect
our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” (WN, I:2)
There are two conditions for a correct working of this mechanism: 
1)  Individual must exactly know and describe his utility function, and 
2)  Each individual must be diligent, “continually exerting himself to find out the most
advantageous employment for whatever capital (or work) that he can command” (WN,
IV:2). 
If both conditions are fulfilled, then the “invisible hand,” and “his own advantage
naturally, or rather necessarily, lead him to prefer that employment which is most
advantageous to the society” (Ibid.). 
Are these conditions ever satisfied? In this sense, it should be recognized that Smith
designs two scenarios: the original or natural state, and the political state, so-called by
Smith the “civilized and thriving country” where firm and entrepreneur emerge. In the first
state of things, both conditions are satisfied, and self-interest and the “invisible hand”
produce social equilibrium. On the opposite side, with elements which produce the
harmony in the natural state, the political state cannot guarantee the equilibrium.
Therefore, new moral elements must be added. However, Smith likes to respect the spirit
of the model, and he presents moral elements as “natural” evolution of the system. 
His attempt was unsuccessful and his entrepreneurial theory could be understood as the
corollary of this failure. The Smithian enterprise and entrepreneur hail from an artificial
selection process, which are principally characterized by “the fact that it is under the
control of a human agent” (Hodgson, 2002:267).
Foster (1997:430) supports that the major failure of biological analogies in economics lies
“in the creative and cooperative dimension of human behavior in the economic domain.”18
With the opposite view, Nelson and Winter (1982) understand, as Smith, that “internal
organization of the firm could involve the internal selection of habits and routines.” I will
show following the thought of Smith, that it is Foster who is correct. 
a)  The natural state and the social harmony
Smithian’s natural state, very similar to that of John Locke, is defined as “that original
state of things, which precedes both the appropriation of land and the accumulation of
stock.  In this state the whole produce of labor belongs to the laborer” (WN, I:8). As it has
been said, in this stage of the society, both conditions for equilibrium are candidly satisfied
by everybody. 
With respect to the perfect knowledge about self-interest, Smith strictly follows the design
of Locke. “Second Treatise on Government” (1690, VIII:87) supports that humans, being
born with a title of freedom, have by nature a power to judge for themselves. Each
individual is his best judge, because only he knows perfect and completely what is
beneficial and harmful for himself and what is the advantageous employment for his
resources. Smith pays homage to Locke (Cf. Macintyre, 1988:238; Dumont, 1977:116),
affirming that “every man is, no doubt, by nature, first and principally recommended to his
own care. And as he is fitter to take care of himself than of any other person, it is fit and
right that it should be so” (TMS, II:2,1,10). 
Despite that it only presents a natural division of labor, this state presents simple
commercial activities, derived by the natural “propensity to truck and barter.” There are no
workers, no capitalists or entrepreneurs; but individuals. There are not different behaviors
among men due to their commercial functions. In natural societies, Smith describes (WN,
I:10), “the varied occupations of every man oblige every man to exert his capacity and to
invent expedients for removing difficulties which are continually occurring… every man is
a warrior. Every man, too, is in some measure a statesman, and can form a tolerable19
judgment concerning the interest of the Society and the conduct of those who govern it”
(WN, V:1,3).
The individual has neither a landholder nor a master to share with him because the effort of
laboring is the price paid by the appropriation (Myrdal, 1953:92); therefore, each
individual desires to reduce the cost.  Furthermore, it can be supposed that everyone is
motivated “to find out the most advantageous employment” for whatever result of his
labor.  This, therefore, satisfies the second condition for equilibrium.
Economics interpreted these ideas affirming that utility functions were formed in the
privative sphere of the individual. There were not interdependencies among functions.
They were not connected directly but indirectly around the “invisible hand.” The next step
on the development of the NE was to add the premise that utility functions were stable and
that if some variations were observed there was a simple explanation: a change in the
individual’s preferences. If utility functions were independent, and both conditions were
satisfied, the “invisible hand” obtained equilibrium, the efficiency and the social and
spontaneous harmony.
Unfortunately, most neo-classical economists have only read WN; therefore, the mistake
has entered into economics: the title of perfect freedom and knowledge that Locke supports
and Smith rescues result only possible in a natural state (Cf. Calderón, 1997:122).
Commercial society is not a natural state. It presupposes political (artificial) institutions,
rules of game, limitations. 
b)  The political state and the social unbalance
How is the tendency to equilibrium modified by the political environment? Locke and
practically every modern philosopher understand that the political state was born by
necessity, and as result of a social contract. Smith affirms (WN,V.2) that “civil
government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for20
the defense… of those who have some property against those who have none at all… It is
only under the shelter of the civil magistrate that the owner of that valuable property,
which is acquired by the labor of many years, or perhaps of many successive generations,
can sleep a single night in security”.
In this artificial scenario, the concurrence of independent utility functions and the
“invisible hand” do not necessarily guide individuals and the society to equilibrium,
because both general conditions —knowledge about self-interest and motivation to looking
for the best employment for resources— can not be satisfied.
When the appropriation of land and the accumulation of stock (and the consequent
scarcity) force a movement from the original state to a political state, conditions change. In
the productive point of view, society is divided into three parts: laborers; landholders; and
entrepreneurs; that is, merchants and master manufacturers “who live by profit.” Out of the
simplicity of the natural state, ambiguities of the self-interest, limits of knowledge, and
uncertainties of the consequences of actions enter (Cf. Hausman, 2002:1770). Everybody is
affected, but everybody is not affected in an identical form and measure: laborers are
affected by gross ignorance; landholders by indolence, and entrepreneurs by egoism. I
would like to stress that the major uncertainty of the political state is not the information,
which “is problematic only when access is costly” (Loasby, 2002:1227), but the agent
himself. Inside an uncertain universe, the individual could exaggerate joys and pains. He is
not able to define exactly his utility function and, therefore, he cannot maximize it.
Smith expressly recognizes difficulties. In fact, when he notes that the equilibrium is not
assured, he is hastened to observe the evolution of the system. He gives an opening to a
third element, a new concept —the voice of the moral agent— described as the
sympathetic and impartial spectator.
Let me clarify the nature of this emergence, because this third element of the Smithian
theory must not be understood as an artificial evolution, but as a natural development.21
The voice of the moral agent is absent in the natural state, however this absence must not
be understood as an innovation but as silence. The third element is in the self-interest of
the agent, but it is asleep. It only awakens when it is necessary to do so (Cf. Frantz,
2000:13).
Hausman (2002) supports that, by nature, some people have competence to be leaders;
however, there are not, they are “choosing not to use” the competence. The choice to enact
the role of the leader or not, is made in terms of a preference. It is possible that, changing
the circumstances, someone decides to be the leader. With an identical argument, Smith
supports that in a natural state, individuals develop the propensity to truck, barter, and
exchange (WN, I:2). This is not the effect of any contract, but of the accidental occurrence
of their passions in the same object at that particular time. For harmonizing this propensity,
individuals require no self-denial, no self-command, and no great exertion of the sense of
propriety. Relationships consist only in the instantaneous material exchanges. 
When Society progresses, living in a civilized and thriving country, bonds are necessary,
and relationships awaken another propensity: sympathy. This natural evolution will help
individuals with ambiguities in their interests. 
Sympathy is a natural capability: through it, man is able to put himself in the position of
the other, feeling his sentiments. Smith says, “sympathy with the person who feels those
passions, exactly coincides with his concern for the person who is the object of them. The
interest, which, as a man, he is obliged to take in the happiness of this last, enlivens his
fellow-feeling with the sentiments of the other, whose emotions are employed about the
same object” (TMS, I, 2:ii).
Everybody is sympathetically united with the others. In this sense, Smith opens TMS
(I:1.a) affirming: “how selfish so ever man may be supposed, there are evidently some
principles in his nature which interest him in the fortune of others and render their
happiness necessary to him.” In his “Astronomy” (IV:6.1) Smith supports that “the22
principles of connection and mutual attraction eliminate completely difficulties where old
theories had stumbled.” Both constitute the third Smithian element. Frank (2000:9)
underlies that Smithian sympathy “played the same role in human society and moral affairs
as gravidity played in physical universe. Toward sympathy, people can keep in their own
orbit and in harmony with others.”
In the “Treatise of Human Nature” (1739-40; III.1.), Hume, best friend and great influence
for Smith, affirms: “when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean
nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature, you have a feeling or sentiment of
blame from the contemplation of it… Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compared to
sounds, heat or colors… are not qualities in objects but perceptions of the mind.”
In this sense, it is possible that perceptions of other agents could help the ambiguities of
the self-interest. Thus, the sympathy produces an unconscious collusion of judges. If these
judges are objective; that is, if these judges are the result of the no utilitarian sympathy,
they are able to produce an impartial judgement. The majority opinion is converted in the
“expect advise” of the “impartial spectator”.
Smith supports that, by nature, the individual hopes and desires for public estimation. In
other words, individuals like to consume “admiration and appreciation.”
2 These
“merchandises” are in their utility functions, beside others material articles. The second
type could be bought with money; however, the first can only be achieved with morality.
Sympathy results in the agent’s behavior and the behavior expressed as correct by the
impartial spectator to become similar. 
In this theory, the essence of the “invisible hand” —an automatic and spontaneous
mechanism— is perfectly respected. Furthermore, the inclusion of moral variables must be
                                                          
2 This behavior is called by Etzioni (1990) “interdependent utility”: “altruistic acts are explained by actor’s pleasure”
(26). 23
understood as a natural evolution of the system of freedom, because these elements are not
under the control of a human agent. 
If Smithian and NE theories are well-conceived, then the “invisible hand” governing
rational individuals, who maximize one utility formed by material consumption and natural
sympathetic happiness, will produce equilibrium and efficiency. Moreover, these elements
must explain the function of all the secondary institutions including the firm and
entrepreneur.
I will immediately show why this is not possible and illustrate the problems that political
state creates in laborers, landholders, and entrepreneurs, and how sympathy comes to the
rescue. I will explain how and why, when the entrepreneurial environment is analyzed, the
efficiency of the natural mechanism is annulled and the movement derives artificial
evolution. I will begin by explaining how and why self-interest is affected and if sympathy
is able or unable to correct ambiguities. 
b.1. The laborer
Tending to equilibrium, in a political state, the major affectation is suffered by laborers.
When natural division of labor is changed by technical division, work is sectioned into
very short tasks, producing many consequences in the cognitive mechanisms of laborers. In
the original state, “man had a considerable degree of knowledge, ingenuity, and invention,
which was generally sufficient for conducting the whole simple business of the
society…unlike the civilized state, where few men sometimes possess an improved and
refined understanding” (WN,V:1.3).
By laborers, technical division produces simple and repetitive operations. Exercising their
capabilities and cognitive mechanisms is not necessary. If the understanding is not
practiced, Smith concludes “gross ignorance and stupidity overtake.” These features, “in a
civilized society, seem so frequently to benumb the understandings of all the inferior ranks24
of people” (WN, V:1.P.3,art.2). Reading these sentences, it is impossible to forget those
others written by Frederic W. Taylor (1911:75): “the pig-iron handler is not an
extraordinary man difficult to find, he is merely a man more or less of the type of the ox,
heavy both mentally and physically.” Due to the perverse effects of the division of labor,
many people, affected by “gross ignorance and stupidity,” are unable to define their own
interest; therefore, the first condition for equilibrium is not satisfied. 
On the other hand, now the whole produce of labor does not belong to the laborer. On most
occasions, ordinary wages are not sufficient for the laborer to support a family (WN, I:8).
Many laborers, unable to improve their condition, become indolent and loafers, thus the
second condition of equilibrium is also not satisfied. 
In brief: in a political state, the laborer does not know his own interest; neither is he
diligent. Because the laborers’ class represents the majority in the society, it must be
concluded that the mechanism of the “invisible hand” needs to be helped. 
b.2. The landholder
With respect to the citizens non-laborers —who are owners of lands or have accumulated
stocks— changes produced are very different. I start with the ambiguities of the
landholder’s interest.
“Rent, considered as the price paid for the use of land is naturally a monopoly price. It is
not at all proportioned to what the landholder may have laid out upon the improvement of
the land, or to what he can afford to take; but to what the farmer can afford to give”
(WN,I.11). With these conditions, it must be concluded that, if he is a rational agent, “in
adjusting the terms of the lease, the landholder endeavors to leave him no greater share of
the produce than what is sufficient to keep up the stock from which he furnishes the seed,
pays the labor, and purchases and maintains the cattle and other instruments of husbandry,
together with the ordinary profits of farming stock in the neighborhood” (Ibid).25
Nevertheless, Smith notes: “sometimes, indeed, the liberality, more frequently the
ignorance, of the landholder, makes him accept somewhat less than this portion” (Ibid).
Landholders get placed in an enviable monopolistic position of maximizing their utility
function. However, they have problems with the second condition to equilibrium: they
suffer indolence, “which is the natural effect of the ease and security of their situation,
renders them too often, not only ignorant, but incapable of that application of mind which
is necessary in order to foresee and understand the consequences of any public regulation”
(WN,I,11: conc.).
Summarizing: landholders, as well as laborers, have some problems in the tendency to
equilibrium. In the case of the manual laborers, the problem is located in the self-interest,
being in a big proportion a no-culpable ignorance, and in the case of the landholders, the
problems turn around the second condition, because the indolence is a voluntary
psychological characteristic of this class. 
b.3. The entrepreneur
Smithian’s entrepreneur presents very special characteristics. 
WN  (II:3), continuation of the discourse started in  TMS (IV.1), is dedicated to the
distinction between productive and unproductive work. There, Smith separates productive
work —“which adds value to the object that is incorporated”— and unproductive work —
“which is not concrete nor creates any kind of particular commodity able to be sold.”
Smith qualifies those people who add value as “benefactors of Society,” while he suggests
that the unproductive workers “are enemies to Society” (TMS, IV:2.i).
Smith provides an ample list of individuals integrated in this last category: military, civil
servants, artists, doctors, judges, priests, lawyers, “men of letters in all classes,” those who,
as Marx (1867) denotes, “even though are neither productive nor are particularly
destructive, but, nevertheless know how to appropriate a good part of the material Wealth26
by selling one’s immaterial commodities or putting them to use.” It can be observed that all
have an intellectual activity, like that of an entrepreneur. 
In this panorama one question emerges: is the entrepreneurial function productive or
unproductive work?  In WN (I:6), Smith supports: “the profits of stock, it may perhaps be
thought, are only a different name for the wages of a particular sort of  labor, the labor of
inspection and direction. They are, however, altogether different, are regulated by quite
different principles, and bear no proportion to the quantity, the hardship, or the ingenuity
of this supposed labor of inspection and direction. They are regulated altogether by the
value of the stock employed, and are greater or smaller in proportion to the extent of this
stock.”
Indeed, if there is not relation between function and effort, skill or confidence, then I must
conclude that the activity of the entrepreneur is not productive work, but “passive”
behavior, similar to that of landholder. Smith does not have the same conclusion as I WN
(II:3) affirms: “in that rude state of Society… it is not necessary that any stock should be
accumulated or stored up beforehand in order to carry on the business of the Society… But
when the division of labor has once been thoroughly introduced, a stock of goods of
different kinds, must be stored… A weaver cannot apply himself entirely to his peculiar
business, unless there is beforehand stored up somewhere, either in his own possession or
in that of some other person, a stock sufficient to maintain him, and to supply him with the
materials and tools of his work, till he has not only completed, but sold his web.”
If the accumulation “must, evidently, be previous to his applying his industry for so long a
time to such a peculiar business.”,  then it is needed, firstly, that some persons have
previously accumulated stocks (capital), and, secondly, that a part of these persons employ
their stocks in maintaining labor. In other words, that someone promotes the birth of the
firm. Because the division of labor is the major cause of “the greatest improvement in the
productive powers of labor” (WN,I:1), and wealth and prosperity are effects of the27
productivity of the labor, then persons, who employ their capitals creating business and
maintaining labor, deserve to be qualified as “benefactors of the society” (TMS, IV,2:5).
Although the entrepreneur presents intellectual or passive nature, in the language of WN
whichever benefactor of the society is a productive agent. 
Under what aspects is entrepreneur productive? Under aspects of prudence and parsimony.
In TMS (IV:1.8), Smith distinguishes between two types of people. The first type are those
who employ their accumulation of stocks in order to obtain commodities “which later are
put to public show.” These individuals are motivated by their luxury and caprice. The envy
that the luxury produces among the rich incites new accumulations and new luxury. Most
of landholders could be included in this category. The second type of person is the prudent
man “able to refrain from present appetites and in the end better able to satisfy them in
other occasions in the aspect of property just as well as that of utility.
” This individual can
invert the stock, obtained through his frugal behavior, in maintaining labor and developing
its division. In the Smithian way of thinking, entrepreneurs seem to be prudent men:
“Parsimony, and not industry, is the immediate cause of the increase of capital” (WN, II.3).
Developing his own interest, which is perfectly known to himself, and doted by a great
level of diligence, prudence, and frugality, the entrepreneur promotes the division of labor.
In contradiction to the ignorance of the laborers and the indolence of the landholders, the
self-command of entrepreneurs appear as tending to harmony and fulfilling all conditions
of equilibrium. Moreover, everyone sympathizes with them, because “the resolute firmness
of the person who acts in this manner and in order to obtain a great though remote
advantage, not only gives up all present pleasures, but endures the greatest labor both of
mind and body, necessarily commands our approbation. That view of his interest and
happiness which appears to regulate his conduct, exactly tallies with the idea which we
naturally form of it. There is the most perfect correspondence between his sentiments and
our own” (TSM, IV:2). 28
The sympathy and admiration to the entrepreneur that are shown in TSM are in opposition
with some of the statements of WN.  In WN, many negative judgements about the
entrepreneur can be found.  In fact, it should be acknowledge that Smith does not love
those “who live by profit.” They do not suffer the disadvantages of mechanical laborers; in
contradiction, they know perfectly their own interest. The landholders have no
psychological defects; contrarily, they continually exert themselves to find the most
advantageous employment for their capital. In fact, they have “frequently more acuteness
of understanding that the greater part of country gentlemen” (WN, I:11). Nevertheless,
Smith thinks that they ignore the “public interest” and reject the sympathy. 
As promoters, the Smithian entrepreneurs are motors of prosperity and wealth. However,
in developing the division of labor, that is, in their movements in the market after the
promotion of the division of labor, the entrepreneurs behavior presents irreversible defects.
Smith does not explain what the role of the businessman is inside the firm after it is born.
He only explains how the social harmony could be affected by entrepreneurial
characteristics.
The self-command of entrepreneurs promotes the division of labor; however, after this the
entrepreneurs do not have a special role.  Additionally, as the activity of the firm continues,
other bad entrepreneurial tendencies emerge.  Smith concretely observes 
a)  A tendency to monopolistic situation and 
b)  An exclusive corporation spirit. 
Both conclude with a conspiracy against the social harmony. 
With respect to competence in the market, Smith explains a “good management can never
be universally established but in consequence of that free and universal competition which
forces everybody to have recourse to it for the sake of self-defence” (WN I:11). While the
price of monopoly is upon every occasion the highest which can be attained, “the natural29
price or the price of free competition, on the contrary, is the lowest which can be taken, not
upon every occasion, indeed, but for any considerable time together. The one is upon every
occasion the highest which can be squeezed out of the buyers… the other is the lowest
which the sellers can commonly afford to take, and at the same time continue their
business” (WN, I:7). Competence reduces prices of merchandise until a natural price is
obtained. With this price, the quantity of every commodity brought to market naturally
suits itself to the effectual demand.  In this sense, for any considerable period, the market
overtakes equilibrium. 
Smith verifies, however, that “when the stocks of many rich merchants are turned into the
same trade, their mutual competition naturally tends to lower its profit, and when there is a
like increase of stock in all the different trades carried on in the same society, the same
competition must produce the same effect in them all” (WN, I:9). Thus, competition is
opposed to the self-interests of businessmen. The conclusion is obvious: “the interest of the
dealers, in any particular branch of trade or manufactures, is always in some respects
different from, and even opposite to, that of the public. To widen the market and to narrow
competition is always in the interest of the dealers. To widen the market may frequently be
agreeable enough to the interest of the public; however, to narrow competition must always
be against it and can serve only to enable the dealers, by raising their profits above what
they naturally would be, to levy, for their own benefit, an absurd tax upon the rest of their
fellow citizens” (WN, I:11, Conc.). 
In the long term, competence is beneficial for the society, but in the short term and in
relation with each dealer, a monopolistic situation is more beneficial. The dealer knows his
own interest well and, therefore, the “invisible hand” cannot secure equilibrium.
Therefore, sympathy is the only resource that is able to obtain equilibrium.  In this sense,
the impartial spectator proposing free competition as “moral action” is necessary.30
However, the second bad entrepreneurial tendency, the strong corporation spirit, does not
allow sympathy to act; the example of wages is very illustrative in this area.
As has been illustrated, technical division of labor produces gross ignorance and indolence
in laborers. Smith understands that sympathetic relations may be able to eliminate these
failures. His argument is that new division of labor has overtaken old gilds and other
professional relationships. Without these associations, some connections between
profession and social place were destroyed.  Following technical division, only rents
permit placing laborers in the society (Weber called “proletariat of consumers”). Making
progress is, therefore, equivalent to improving rents; that is, to obtain large wages.
However, normally, entrepreneurs like low wages, because they obtain higher profit.  Is it
possible that entrepreneurs sympathize with the laborer who likes to improve his
condition?  It is indeed possible, because “the liberal reward of labor… increases the
industry of the common people. The wages of labor are the encouragement of industry
which, like every other human quality, improves in proportion to the encouragement it
receives… Where wages are highly… we shall always find the workmen more active,
diligent, and expeditious that where they are low” (WN, I:8). 
If entrepreneurs and laborers, working together, can obtain improvements, does not
sympathy emerge?  The answer is offered by Smith: “masters are always and everywhere
in a short of tacit but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labor
above their actual rate. To violate this combination is everywhere a most popular action,
and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbors and equals” (WN, I:8).  Note that it
is the “impartial spectators” of masters who hinder the sympathetic equilibrium. It is
possible that the profit obtained through low wages and indolent laborers is the same as
that obtained through high wages and diligent and expeditious laborers; however,
entrepreneurs always opt for control of the industry with subsistence’ s wages. 31
In this discourse, Smith compares merchants and manufactures with clergymen. Both
begin well; however, both damage society in the end. “The clergy of an established and
well-endowed religion frequently become men of learning and elegance, who possess all
the virtues of gentlemen, or which can recommend them to the esteem of gentlemen, but
they are apt gradually to lose the qualities, both good and bad, which gave them authority
and influence with the inferior ranks of people, and which had perhaps been the original
causes of the success and establishment of their religion” (WN, V:2). The authority of the
clergymen is maintained “employing all the terrors of religion” (Ibid). The authority of the
businessman is maintained employing the “remunerative power” and the poverty of the
laborers. 
At this stage, if equilibrium is obtained, it will be under the control of an association of
entrepreneurs. This artificiality in the “control” center of organization is the major
preoccupation of Smith. 
In spite of this, society needs entrepreneurs to promote the division of labor, if society
admits that they have organizational control, the free market disappears, prices increase,
and wealth retrogresses. Is it very odd the theoretical position of Smith? His model speaks
consciously about the firm as a division of labor in a black box. 
Smith finishes the first book of WN with the next terrible sentences: “it comes from an
order of men (entrepreneurs) whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the
public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who
accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.” I would like to
conclude by asking Mr. Smith why, if knowing that neither economics, nor sentiments,
could prevent the permanent social unbalance, he has not permitted that the moral person,
exclusive solution for his headache, to enter into his model.
In the Spanish translation of the WN (Alonso Ortiz,1794:319), the translator adds the last
cited paragraph: “We judge the tendency of the class, but there are entrepreneurs who,32
lovers of the nation and its common good, negotiate looking for their own interests without
damage for the public interest.”  Note that both demand moral actors. 
4. Socio-economic organization
Two types of factors explain why, in the last three decades, the number of followers of
socio-economics (SE) is increasing.  Firstly, many theoreticians have been attracted by the
quality of its assumptions, especially its determination to include the person as a subject
and an agent of social processes. Secondly, many scientists, observing the hard and
continuous (theoretical and practical) defects that the rival paradigm —the neo-classical—
produces, hope that the new paradigm replaces the old.  Nevertheless, despite its growth of
initiates and followers, SE presents an exponential tendency where the finishing line can be
seen only in the distance; the path opened is very, very long.
It is known that the neo-classical body of hypothesis is manageable but not realistic, and
that formal models of rational choice explain nothing; however, in the real world the “neo-
classical paradigm plays a major role in our public policy, dialogues, intellectual life, and
the social and political philosophies that the public embraces” (Etzioni, 1990:2). 
Everyone understands that the human heart is occupied by self-interest, but, also, by other
lodgers, such as altruism, love, or, even, stupidity. Everyone also knows that in the human
head, instrumental rationality, collective thinking, and the compulsive and routine actions
exist together. However, the three core assumptions of the NE —individualism,
utilitarianism, and rationalism— are maintained as roots of business school programs, and,
many “experts,” entrepreneurs, and governors, apply these theories. 
From time to time, some defects are detected in the function of the invisible hand —i.e.
starvation, corruption, or a simple light distribution problem— taking on the first page of
the newspapers. However few people believe that the system is dying. Defects are33
understood as “collateral and secondary effects” of the system and we continue living in a
neo-classical world.
In others words, people —theoreticians, politicians, or businessmen— understand that NE
is not yet a falsifiable theory (Popper, 1965), essentially because there is not a new formal
developed paradigm and SE has not “become institutionalized” (Etizoni, 2003:106).
In this context, SE can be understood as a declaration of intentions, not as a “competitor’s
paradigm,” neither as an ordered system.  Some people ask if SE is called to replace the
NE, or if it is only called to awaken the moral conscience of individuals.  Some people
question if SE hopes to be a “winning horse” or if it will play the role of the preachers
which James Buchanan (1994) demands for the NE. 
When in “The Third Way” Etzioni describes the “Good Society,” he develops a “new
utopia,” accepting that, despite many efforts, the way to achieve it is “not fully etched”
(2000:13). However, that does not diminish the way, although it will be a long and hard
travel, finally there is a way, and every way develops its nature when it is walked.  To the
extent that the elements of the “third way” are more etched and SE hypothesis are more
developed, the arrival of the “Good Society”, although asymptotic, will be closer. In this
sense, electing the more efficient system of walking is vital. 
Because NE is a paradise by individuals, SE requires a different paradigm, one of diverse
core-values. In the NE, families, associations, communities, states, and others collective
actions cannot prosper. In this sense, Etzioni (2003:108) supports that SE “is more likely to
consider actions by the community and state as the first step.” My thesis is that,
understanding the little collective actions, such as those of the firm, will allow easier
progression to the larger collective actions such as the state or the community. 
Recognizing my economic slant, I understand that a good complementary system to
developing SE may be starting with the more falsifiable elements of the NE. “It is a grave34
error —Etzioni affirms (2003:110)— to treat the economy as a self-sustaining system, to
view the market as separate from the society.” From a methodological point of view, I
believe that it is also a grave failure to treat the firm as a collection of individuals.
Evidence suggests that in some cases, probably few, the global price of farmer’s products,
for instance cereal, could be explained by supply and demand.  Nevertheless, there are very
few cases where entrepreneurial behavior can be explained as the summation of individual
behaviors. 
Both focuses are naturally complementary. Obviously it is necessary to think about a non-
automatic market, a market without clock mechanism. However, in my opinion, practical
fatal errors of the NE are not located in the conceptions of the bigger systems and relations,
but in the structures that they have in their own.  It is in the working and development of
these structures, where human persons result direct and profoundly affected.
In the third millenium, undeniably corporations occupy an outstanding place in society and
a big part of the population are greatly affected by their entrepreneurial decisions. Most of
these corporations follow neo-classical logic.  Nevertheless, as has been illustrated, inside
the general equilibrium models, “there is no place for salient institutions, such as the
money or the firm” (Dunn, 2000: 422). 
I understand that this schizophrenia can largely be exploited  by SE.  The following
tentative list shows some greater reasons for this affirmation:
a)  While the NE supports that the firm and the market are alternative methods of
coordinating production and that “the distinction between firm and market appears to
be more a matter of degree than kind” (Masten, 1993: 197; Cf. Coase, 1937), evidence
shows that there are fundamental differences between allocation by prices and
allocation by authority. 35
b)  Relations between labor markets and society cannot explain relations between firms
and the community. Entrepreneurial behaviors must be analyzed from interstitial and
interdisciplinary paradigms, such as SE. 
c)  While the neo-classical agent seeks to maximize utility, business behavior tends to
satisfaction (Cf. Simon, 1959).
d)  While the neo-classical utility function includes only material elements, the firm,
which tends to survive, needs to include no-material or moral elements. 
e)  While the neo-classical environment is the certainty or, in the best of the cases, the
probabilistic uncertainty, the firm works in uncertainty and, even, in a chaotic
environment. Routines, very useful in the first case, cannot resolve many problems
presented in the complexity. Past and present centuries have presented periods
characterized by non-deterministic complexity and fundamental uncertainty.
f)  While the NE only admits limits “on the power of individuals to receive, store, retrieve,
and process information without error” (Williamson, 1985:21; Cf. Simon, 1956), the
firm, defined as collective thinking, admits barriers to reason.  While the neo-classical
individual is always able to correctly formulate the problem, being the estimation of the
probabilities of the major problem, the firm needs the concurrence of many people to
define what is the problem and what are the alternatives. 
g)  While in the NE the individual is the decision-making unit, the firm needs to define
supra-individual units. Instantaneous market’s contracts do not create synergies. They
appear always inside human processes which are repeated, that is, processes where
personal connections (not technical relations) are repeated. Frequently, the person
moves the individual. 
h)  Corruption can be manifested at both the individual level and the group level; members
can act cooperatively to organize corruption (Bac, 1996), etc.36
i)  Business behavior hinders that general equilibrium models employs representative
agents.
5. Conclusions 
Indeed, the NE lacks a coherent model of business and businessman. Core assumptions,
especially individualism and instrumental rationality, make it impossible to explain
complex organizations. Smithian’s balance itself is obligated to conclude with a call to
morality. This failure permits results in the emergence of a theoretical scenario in which
SE is developed. In this interstitial and interdisciplinary paradigm, the firm can constitute a
shade piece of thought and reflection.
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Table 2. Smithian Agents
Natural Division of Labor
No appropriation of land 
No accumulation of stock
Technical Division of Labor
Appropriation of land 
Accumulation of stock
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